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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this diversity case, we are presented with disputes 
over coverage under two contracts, an indemnification agreement 
between a contractor and subcontractor and a subsequent insurance 
contract between the subcontractor and an insurance company.  The 
primary issue is whether the indemnification agreement 
sufficiently waived the immunity granted employers under the 
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.  The district court 
partially granted cross-motions for summary judgment, holding the 
contractor was entitled to conditional indemnification but its 
general partner was not.  The district court also dismissed the 
insurer from the case.  We will affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
  
 I. 
 Kiewit/Perini, a joint venture composed of Kiewit 
Eastern Company and Perini Corporation, served as general 
contractor for construction of a portion of Interstate 476, known 
as the Blue Route, near Philadelphia.  In July 1988, 
Kiewit/Perini subcontracted certain work to L&R Construction 
which agreed to defend and indemnify Kiewit/Perini and obtain 
insurance in order to protect the general contractor from 
liability for personal injuries resulting in whole or in part 
from the subcontractor's negligence.  As a result, L&R 
Construction purchased an insurance policy from CNA Insurance 
Company covering liability resulting from L&R Construction's 
incidental contracts, such as its contract with Kiewit/Perini.  
 During construction, a crane loaned to L&R Construction 
by Kiewit Eastern came too close to a power line, injuring 
Benedict Chen, an employee of L&R Construction.  Chen brought two 
actions in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against 
Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit Eastern,1 but not against L&R 
Construction, which -- as Chen's employer -- was immune from suit 
under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.2  After 
Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit Eastern tendered their defense to CNA 
Insurance, which refused to accept the tender, they filed a 
                     
1
.   Chen v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. 91-1339 (Ct. C.P. 
Phila. County filed Jan. 11, 1991); Chen v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., No. 91-1753 (Ct. C.P. Phila. County filed July 10, 1991). 
2
.   Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 481 (1992). 
  
third-party complaint against L&R Construction, alleging it was 
obligated to defend and indemnify them.   
 Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit Eastern then filed this 
declaratory judgment action in federal court, seeking a defense 
and indemnification from L&R Construction or CNA Insurance, as 
well as reimbursement for attorneys' fees and costs.  All parties 
filed motions for summary judgment.  The district court granted 
Kiewit/Perini's motion in part, requiring L&R Construction to 
defend and conditionally indemnify it, but held as a matter of 
law that L&R Construction owed no duty to defend or indemnify 
Kiewit Eastern.  After deciding those defense and indemnification 
issues, the court dismissed the claim against CNA Insurance as 
moot.  Kiewit Eastern Co. v. L&R Constr. Co., Civ. A. No. 91-
5563, 1993 WL 367051 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1993) ("Kiewit I").  The 
district court denied a subsequent motion to amend the judgment, 
Kiewit Eastern Co. v. L&R Constr. Co., Civ. A. No. 91-5563, 1994 
WL 116108 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1994) ("Kiewit II"), and 
Kiewit/Perini, Kiewit Eastern, and CNA Insurance appealed. 
 The district court had jurisdiction of the case under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).3  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
                     
3
.   The parties do not contest jurisdiction.  The 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988), permits "the 
discretionary exercise of jurisdiction over suits otherwise 
falling under federal subject matter jurisdiction," a form of 
discretion "significantly greater" than that permitted under 
traditional abstention principles.  United States v. Commonwealth 
of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 923 F.2d 1071, 1074 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
 We considered this discretion in a similar situation, a 
case in which an insurance company sought a declaratory judgment 
on its duty to defend and indemnify an insured in a pending state 
  
1291 (1988).  Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, our review is plenary.  Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 637-38; see also Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). 
 II. 
(..continued) 
action.  Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  In Terra Nova, we reversed the district court's stay 
of the federal proceedings on the duty to defend, but affirmed 
the stay on the duty to indemnify.  Id. at 1228.  In affirming 
the district court's exercise of discretion to stay the 
proceedings on the duty to indemnify, we found persuasive three 
factors: 
 
 1) the general policy of restraint when the 
same issues are pending in a state court; 2) 
an "inherent conflict of interest" between an 
insurer's duty to defend in a state court and 
its attempt to characterize, in the federal 
suit, the state court suit as arising under a 
policy exclusion; and 3) an avoidance of 
duplicative litigation. 
 
Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 923 F.2d at 1075-
76 (discussing Terra Nova).  Some of those factors may be 
implicated in this case.  Here, a third-party complaint pleading 
the right to indemnification already had been filed by the Kiewit 
entities against L&R Construction in at least one of the 
underlying state tort cases; thus, the Pennsylvania courts may 
well have provided a more suitable and satisfactory forum for 
determining the issues before us.  See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. 
Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942) ("Ordinarily it would be 
uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed 
in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a 
state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal 
law, between the same parties.").  Nevertheless, because no party 
has raised the matter on appeal, we need not decide this 
question. 
  
 Section 11 of the subcontract between Kiewit/Perini and 
L&R Construction provided: 
  INDEMNIFICATION.  The Subcontractor 
further specifically obligates itself to the 
Contractor, Owner and any other party 
required to be indemnified under the Prime 
Contract, jointly and separately, in the 
following respects, to-wit: 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (b) to defend and indemnify them against 
and save them harmless from any and all 
claims, suits or liability for . . . injuries 
to persons, including death, and from any 
other claims, suits or liability on account 
of acts or omissions of Subcontractor, or any 
of its subcontractors, suppliers, officers, 
agents, employees or servants, whether or not 
caused in part by the active or passive 
negligence or other fault of a party 
indemnified hereunder; provided, however, 
Subcontractor's duty hereunder shall not 
arise if such claims, suits or liability, 
injuries or death or other claims or suits 
are caused by the sole negligence of a party 
indemnified hereunder unless otherwise 
provided in the Prime Contract.  
Subcontractor's obligation hereunder shall 
not be limited by the provisions of any 
Workers' Compensation act or similar 
statute[.]4 
                     
4
.   A similar indemnification provision in the subcontract 
covered equipment the subcontractor borrowed from the contractor: 
 
  CONTRACTOR'S EQUIPMENT.  In the event 
that Subcontractor by rental, loan or 
otherwise, makes use of any of Contractor's 
equipment, scaffolding, or other appliances, 
Subcontractor agrees to accept such "as is" 
and that such use shall be at the sole risk 
of Subcontractor and Subcontractor agrees to 
defend, hold harmless and indemnify 
Contractor against all claims of every nature 
arising from its use thereof.   
 
  
(emphasis added).   
 A. 
 The district court held the indemnification language 
required L&R Construction to defend and conditionally indemnify 
Kiewit/Perini.  Kiewit I, supra, at *8.  L&R Construction does 
not dispute this holding, but its insurance company, CNA 
Insurance, does.5  
 Pennsylvania law permits indemnification, even for the 
indemnitee's own negligence, as long as the agreement to 
indemnify is "clear and unequivocal."  Ruzzi v. Butler Petroleum 
Co., 588 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 1991); Willey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. 
Co., 755 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1985).  In this case, CNA 
Insurance claims the language of the subcontract generally is 
ambiguous and should be interpreted against the indemnitee.6  We 
cannot agree.  Under Pennsylvania law, "[w]hen a written contract 
is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its 
(..continued) 
Subcontract § 22. 
5
.   Both L&R Construction and CNA Insurance agreed that, if 
L&R Construction is found to owe a duty to defend and indemnify, 
then CNA Insurance will have the obligation to fulfill that duty, 
pursuant to the CNA insurance policy. 
6
.   CNA Insurance contends the difference in 
interpretations offered by the parties to this action 
demonstrates the ambiguities inherent in the contract.  
Pennsylvania courts repeatedly have rejected such reasoning.  
See, e.g., Vogel v. Berkley, 511 A.2d 878, 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986) ("The fact that the parties do not agree upon the proper 
interpretation does not necessarily render the contract 
ambiguous."); Metzger v. Clifford Realty Corp., 476 A.2d 1, 5 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citation omitted) ("a contract is not 
rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties do not agree 
upon the proper construction").      
  
contents alone.  It speaks for itself and a meaning cannot be 
given to it other than that expressed."  Steuart v. McChesney, 
444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982) (citation omitted).  It is for the 
court, as a matter of law, to determine whether ambiguity exists 
in a contract.  Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 
390 (Pa. 1986).7  In this case, we agree with the district court 
that the indemnification provisions of the subcontract are 
unambiguous, requiring L&R Construction to indemnify 
Kiewit/Perini unless Kiewit/Perini was solely to blame for the 
injury.8   
                     
7
.   Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he fundamental rule in 
construing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intention of the parties."  Lower Frederick Township v. Clemmer, 
543 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. 1988).  Contracts of indemnification often 
allocate between parties the "burden of procuring insurance," 
Jamison v. Ellwood Consol. Water Co., 420 F.2d 787, 789 (3d Cir. 
1970), or determine which entity bears "ultimate responsibility 
for injuries on the job."  Willey v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 
755 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1985).  The indemnification provision 
in this case appears to have been intended for a similar purpose, 
particularly since it was accompanied by a requirement that the 
subcontractor obtain insurance.  See Subcontract § 10. 
8
.   Section 11 of the subcontract states: "Subcontractor's 
duty hereunder shall not arise if such claims, suits or 
liability, injuries or death or other claims or suits are caused 
by the sole negligence of a party indemnified hereunder unless 
otherwise provided in the Prime Contract."  In Woodburn v. 
Consolidation Coal Co., 590 A.2d 1273 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal 
denied, 600 A.2d 953, 954, 955 (Pa. 1991), the court construed an 
indemnification provision that also contained a limitation -- 
similar to the one here -- exempting from indemnification 
coverage those claims arising from the "sole negligence" of the 
indemnitee.  The court held such a provision means, by "negative 
inference," that "any injuries occurring by less than the sole 
fault of [the indemnitee] fall within the scope of the 
indemnification clause."  Id. at 1275.  See also Babcock & Wilcox 
Co. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 280 A.2d 582, 583-84 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1971). 
  
 CNA Insurance raises two other insubstantial arguments.  
As we have noted, section 11 of the subcontract provides 
"Subcontractor's duty hereunder shall not arise if such claims, 
suits or liability, injuries or death or other claims or suits 
are caused by the sole negligence of a party indemnified 
hereunder unless otherwise provided in the Prime Contract."  
Because the injured employee Chen sued Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit 
Eastern in negligence but not L&R Construction, CNA Insurance 
claims there is no duty to defend or indemnify because the "sole 
negligence" of Kiewit/Perini and Kiewit Eastern is at issue.  Of 
course, L&R Construction was immune from suit because of the 
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, 
§ 481 (1992).  Just because Chen could not sue L&R Construction 
does not mean the company was blameless in the accident.  As the 
district court noted, legal immunity from suit between Chen and 
L&R Construction does not compel a conclusion that L&R 
Construction was not negligent, nor does it decide the 
contractual rights and obligations between L&R Construction and 
Kiewit/Perini.  Kiewit I, supra, at *6.  The mere absence of 
allegations of negligence against L&R Construction in the 
underlying suit does not negate its obligation to defend and 
indemnify here.9  
                     
9
.   This is not a case in which it appears reasonably 
certain that the indemnitee was solely negligent for the 
underlying injuries.  CNA Insurance's own records indicate that 
L&R Construction employees were operating the crane when Chen was 
injured.  Although we express no opinion on the merits of the 
underlying tort claims or the negligence of any of the parties, 
we note the CNA Insurance records to demonstrate the possibility 
that Kiewit/Perini -- if negligent -- may not have been the only 
  
 Second, CNA Insurance maintains L&R Construction is 
immune from liability for injuries to its employees under the 
Workers' Compensation Act, which provides that the "liability of 
an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any 
and all other liability to such employes . . . ."  Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 77, § 481 (1992) (footnote omitted).  Although the statute 
immunizes employers from indemnification suits by third parties 
who have been sued by injured employees, it exempts from 
protection any employers that contractually agreed with third 
parties to waive their immunity under the statute.10 
 Section 11(b) of the subcontract ends with the proviso 
that "Subcontractor's obligation [to defend and indemnify] 
hereunder shall not be limited by the provisions of any Workers' 
Compensation act or similar statute."  Although the district 
court found this language amounted to an express waiver of 
(..continued) 
negligent party.  Furthermore, we concur with the district court 
that "[t]he assertion by CNA's claim analyst that Kiewit/Perini 
had a 'high degree of negligence' is not sole negligence, nor a 
proper determination of responsibilities."  Kiewit I, supra, at 
*6. 
10
.   See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 481 (1992), which 
provides: 
 
 [T]he employer, his insurance carrier, their 
servants and agents, employes, 
representatives acting on their behalf or at 
their request shall not be liable to a third 
party for damages, contribution, or indemnity 
in any action at law, or otherwise, unless 
liability for such damages, contributions or 
indemnity shall be expressly provided for in 
a written contract entered into by the party 
alleged to be liable prior to the date of the 
occurrence which gave rise to the action. 
  
immunity provided by the Workers' Compensation Act, Kiewit I, 
supra, at *8, CNA Insurance argues on appeal that the subcontract 
does not "expressly provide" that L&R Construction would waive 
its immunity -- as the statute requires. 
 In support of its position, CNA Insurance points to the 
decision in Bester v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 619 A.2d 304 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1993), in which the court denied an indemnity claim.  
The facts in Bester resemble those in the present case: a 
purported indemnitee claimed protection from liability for 
injuries to one of the indemnitor's employees that may have been 
caused by the indemnitee.  Yet the comparison between the two 
cases ends there.  Unlike the indemnification contract here, the 
agreement to indemnify in Bester contained no express waiver of 
the protections of the Workers' Compensation Act or even a 
reference thereto.11 
                     
11
.   In Bester, the indemnification clause stated: 
 
  The Lessee [Russell] shall defend, 
indemnify and hold forever harmless Lessor 
[Essex] against all loss, negligence, damage, 
expense, penalty, legal fees and costs, 
arising from any action on account of 
personal injury or damage to property 
occasioned by the operation, maintenance, 
handling, storage, erection, dismantling or 
transportation of any Equipment while in your 
possession.  Lessor shall not be liable in 
any event for any loss, delay or damage of 
any kind of character resulting from defects 
in or inefficiency of the Equipment hereby 
leased or accidental breakage thereof. . . . 
 
  The Lessee will include the interest of 
ESSEX CRANE RENTAL CORP. as an additional 
named insured under their General Liability, 
Excess Liability, and Automobile Insurance 
  
 Here, the subcontract provides the obligation to defend 
and indemnify "shall not be limited by the provisions of any 
Workers' Compensation act or similar statute."  Bester of course 
did not require that an indemnity contract use any specific 
wording,12 but merely that "such a clause contain plain language 
which would avoid the employer's protection from double 
responsibility which is afforded by the Workmen's Compensation 
Act."13  We can find no Pennsylvania case rejecting an 
indemnification agreement with language similar to the wording 
here.14  We have little difficulty in finding that the language 
of the subcontract is a sufficient waiver to permit indemnity.15  
(..continued) 
Policies as respect to this equipment during 
the term of the rental with minimum liability 
limits of $1,000,000 per occurrence and 
provide a certificate of insurance to Lessor. 
 
619 A.2d at 306. 
12
.   The Bester court noted that "if the indemnification 
agreement is clear and includes indemnification in the event of 
either the indemnitee's or the employer's own negligence, its 
enforceability does not require that the employer, in addition, 
expressly and in haec verba waive the immunity provided by § 
481(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act."  Id. at 307. 
13
.   Id. at 308. 
14
.   See, e.g., Szymanski-Gallagher v. Chestnut Realty Co., 
597 A.2d 1225, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), overruled by Bester, 
619 A.2d at 308; Remas v. Duquesne Light Co., 537 A.2d 881, 882 
(Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 552 A.2d 251, 252 (Pa. 1988); 
Gerard v. Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., 495 A.2d 210, 212 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985). 
15
.   Bester also held the contract insufficient to provide 
indemnity protection for the indemnitee's own negligence.  619 
A.2d at 309 n.2.  In the present case, however, the subcontract 
withheld indemnity only in cases of the indemnitee's "sole 
negligence."  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
  
Therefore, we hold the subcontract requires L&R Construction to 
defend and conditionally indemnify Kiewit/Perini.16 
 B. 
 Our holding, however, does not necessarily apply to 
Kiewit Eastern.  Kiewit Eastern was not a party to the 
subcontract with L&R Construction.  Instead, the agreement 
expressly was "by and between" L&R Construction and 
"Kiewit/Perini, A Joint Venture." 
 Nevertheless, as the joint venture's "managing party," 
Kiewit Eastern maintains it may claim any contractual defense 
available to the joint venture itself.  Kiewit Eastern asserts 
that Pennsylvania partnership law would indemnify a member of a 
partnership in this situation, so joint venture participants 
should be indemnified as well.  Although generally courts have 
analogized joint ventures to partnerships,17 we do not believe 
                     
16
.   As a diversity case, we must predict how the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide these matters.  See Hon 
v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 1987).  Because 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not definitively spoken on 
many of these issues, we have looked to decisions of the 
intermediate Pennsylvania courts.  See Wisniewski v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Although 
lower state court decisions are not controlling on an issue on 
which the highest court of the state has not spoken, federal 
courts must attribute significant weight to these decisions in 
the absence of any indication that the highest state court would 
rule otherwise."). 
17
.   See West v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 106 
A.2d 427, 431 (Pa. 1954) ("while a joint adventure is not the 
same as a partnership . . . a joint adventure does partake in 
many ways of the nature of a partnership, the principal 
difference being that it usually, though not necessarily, applies 
to a single transaction instead of being formed for the conduct 
of a continuing business"); Snellbaker v. Herrmann, 462 A.2d 713, 
716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) ("A joint venture partakes in many ways 
  
that proposition dictates Kiewit Eastern be covered by the 
subcontract here.  Pennsylvania decisions on joint ventures are 
sparse and it is unclear whether the state's courts would apply 
partnership law to the joint venture in this situation.  
Furthermore, application of partnership law would not mandate 
that L&R Construction defend and indemnify Kiewit Eastern, when 
Kiewit Eastern was not even named in the subcontract.   
 To support its contention, Kiewit Eastern cites cases 
holding partners liable to third parties for debts incurred by 
other partners on behalf of the partnership.  See, e.g., McEvoy 
v. Grant, 153 A. 763 (Pa. 1931).  Such a proposition comes as no 
surprise.  Indeed, that doctrine -- holding partners individually 
liable for partnership debts -- lies at the heart of partnership 
law18 and fundamentally distinguishes partnerships from 
corporations.19  Pennsylvania courts have applied this principle 
(..continued) 
of a partnership . . . ."); see also 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures § 
5 (1981) (footnotes omitted) ("The relation of the parties to a 
joint venture is so similar to that in a partnership that their 
rights, duties, and liabilities are usually tested by partnership 
rules, and in numerous decisions it has been broadly held that 
both joint venture and partnership are governed by the same rules 
of law."). 
18
.   See, e.g., 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8327 (Supp. 1994) 
(holding partners liable for debts of the partnership, including 
debts incurred by individual partners); LaFountain v. Webb Indus. 
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 236, 242 n.3 (E.D. Pa.) ("Under Pennsylvania 
. . . law, a partner is individually liable for wrongs committed 
by the partnership."), aff'd, 951 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1991). 
19
.   See, e.g., Board of Trustees of W. Conference of 
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 
1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting the "fundamental difference 
between corporations and partnerships" is "shareholders and 
officers enjoy limited liability; partners do not"). 
  
of partnership law to joint ventures.20  But here we are 
confronted not with joint venturers' liabilities under the law, 
but with their rights -- or lack thereof -- under a contract.  
That Kiewit Eastern may be burdened by the liabilities of 
Kiewit/Perini is the result of statutory and case law; that 
Kiewit Eastern may not benefit from the indemnity afforded 
Kiewit/Perini, however, is the result of contract.21 
 Thus, the law on joint ventures does not permit venture 
participants to claim all defenses available to the entity 
                     
20
.   See, e.g., Snellbaker, 462 A.2d at 716 ("Absent a 
limitation in the [joint venture] agreement, a joint venturer 
will be held responsible with his or her associates for the 
losses sustained by the enterprise."); Newlin Corp. v. 
Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 579 A.2d 996 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding joint venturers liable for pollution 
emanating from a landfill owned by the joint venture), appeal 
denied, 588 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1991). 
21
.   Other states' courts concur with this reasoning.  For 
example, in Azer v. Myers, 793 P.2d 1189, 1209 (Haw. Ct. App.), 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 795 P.2d 853 (Haw. 1990), the 
court held an indemnification clause inapplicable to a partner 
because it "applies to acts or omissions of the partnership, not 
to [defendant] Gromet's individual negligence while acting for 
the partnership."  Contrary to Kiewit Eastern's assertions, 
O'Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. Taleghani, 504 F. Supp. 399 
(E.D. Pa. 1980), does not require a different result.  In 
O'Brien, the plaintiff sought to hold defendants liable as 
"partners by estoppel," rather than under the written contracts 
between the parties.  The court held an individual could not be 
found liable for the business's debts, under the terms of the 
Pennsylvania "partner by estoppel" statute, without benefit of 
any defenses the company would have under the contract.  Id. at 
401.  Thus, the courts in Azer and O'Brien agreed the terms of 
the relevant contracts should control an individual partner's 
rights, which is precisely what we have decided here.  
Furthermore, the O'Brien plaintiff was attempting to hold the 
defendant "liable for the business entity's debts," id.; in the 
present case, Kiewit Eastern is being sued for its own alleged 
negligence, not that of Kiewit/Perini.   
  
itself.  Certainly, Pennsylvania courts have not so held, and we 
decline to extend the law to permit such a claim in this case.  
But our decision does not require members of joint ventures to 
remain unguarded against potential liability.  If joint venturers 
wish indemnity protection to cover themselves as well as the 
joint venture, they need only so specify in their contracts.22 
 Our holding here is consistent with Pennsylvania law 
governing indemnity contracts.  Pennsylvania courts require that 
an indemnity agreement be strictly construed against the party 
asserting it.23  In addition, if an agreement is ambiguous, it is 
to be construed "most strongly" against the party who drafted 
it.24  Both maxims support our interpretation of the subcontract 
                     
22
.   Joint venturers, such as Kiewit Eastern, could ensure 
that any indemnity agreements for the joint venture specifically 
cover the venturers.  The venturers also could limit their 
potential liability in the original agreement forming the 
venture.  See Snellbaker, 462 A.2d at 716 ("The liability of a 
joint venturer for a proportionate part of the losses or 
expenditures of the enterprise may be fixed by the terms of the 
[joint venture] agreement.").  Depending upon the terms of the 
relevant formation agreement here, Kiewit Eastern may have a 
claim for reimbursement against Kiewit/Perini for any damages it 
pays in the underlying tort suits.  See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
8331(2) (Supp. 1994) (subject to any agreement between the 
parties, "[t]he partnership must indemnify every partner in 
respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably 
incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its 
business"). 
23
.   See Phillippe v. Jerome H. Rhoads, Inc., 336 A.2d 374, 
376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975); Lackie v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 
559 F. Supp. 377, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1983); cf. Topp Copy Prods., Inc. 
v. Singletary, 626 A.2d 98, 99 (Pa. 1993).  
24
.   Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, 
Inc., 171 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 1961) (if the meaning of an 
indemnity clause "is ambiguous or reasonably susceptible of two 
interpretations, it must be construed most strongly against the 
party who drew it"); cf. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 
  
as not requiring the defense and indemnification of Kiewit 
Eastern.25 
 C. 
 Section 20 of the subcontract between L&R Construction 
and Kiewit/Perini provides that "[i]n the event either party 
institutes suit in court against the other party or against the 
surety of such party, in connection with any dispute or matter 
arising under this Subcontract, the prevailing party shall be 
(..continued) 
A.2d 385, 390 n.5 (Pa. 1986); Raiken v. Mellon, 582 A.2d 11, 13 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).    
25
.   Kiewit Eastern notes that joint venturers are 
considered agents and principals of the joint venture.  See Gold 
& Co. v. Northeast Theater Corp., 421 A.2d 1151, 1153 n.1 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1980) (citing 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures § 1 
(1969); McRoberts v. Phelps, 138 A.2d 439, 443 (Pa. 1958)).  As 
an agent, Kiewit Eastern claims it is entitled to the benefits of 
the joint venture's contracts with third parties, but it cites no 
authority for that proposition.  We believe Kiewit Eastern 
misinterprets the implication of the statements referring to 
joint venturers as agents and principals.  Such statements merely 
reiterate that each joint venturer has the right to participate 
in both the creation and implementation of the joint venture's 
policies.  See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures § 1 (1969) ("each 
joint venturer shall stand in the relation of principal, as well 
as agent, as to each of the other coventures, with an equal right 
of control of the means employed to carry out the common purpose 
of the venture").  Even if Kiewit Eastern were technically 
considered Kiewit/Perini's "agent," we still would not be 
permitted to "read in" Kiewit Eastern as a party to the 
subcontract and thereby ignore the plain language of the 
agreement.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 323 (1957) ("If 
it appears unambiguously in an integrated contract that the agent 
is a party or is not a party, extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to show a contrary intent . . . .").  As noted, the 
subcontract in this case was unambiguous in stating it was "by 
and between" L&R Construction and "Kiewit/Perini, A Joint 
Venture," with only their representatives signing it.  See id. § 
323 cmt. a ("The statement as to parties may appear either in the 
body of the instrument or in the signature . . . .").  
  
entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees in addition to any 
other relief granted by the court."26  In this case, 
Kiewit/Perini has prevailed on at least some of its claims.  
Nevertheless, the district court denied its request for 
attorneys' fees against L&R Construction, holding that the 
request had not been properly raised.27  
 On appeal, Kiewit/Perini renews its call for attorneys' 
fees and costs from L&R Construction.28  Although Kiewit/Perini 
concedes its summary judgment memorandum did not contain a 
separate section asking L&R Construction for attorneys' fees, it 
asserts it generally requested such fees in the memorandum.  
After reviewing the memorandum, we believe the district court did 
not err in concluding the issue had been waived.  At most, 
Kiewit/Perini made vague references that could be construed only 
                     
26
.   Section 11 of the subcontract contains a similar 
provision:  "The Subcontractor shall defend and indemnify the 
Contractor . . . from, any and all loss, damage, costs, expenses 
and attorneys' fees suffered or incurred on account of any breach 
of the aforesaid obligations . . . ." 
27
.   The district court, in its initial ruling on the 
motions for summary judgment, stated that Kiewit/Perini had not 
sought attorneys' fees against L&R Construction, but only against 
CNA Insurance.  Kiewit I, supra, at *9 n.5.  In a motion to amend 
the judgment under Rule 59(e), Kiewit/Perini argued it had 
requested fees against L&R Construction in the summary judgment 
papers, and it renewed its claim for fees.  The district court 
again rejected the request, explaining "[t]he issue of attorneys 
fees against L&R, whether or not sought in the pleadings, was not 
briefed and argued in the motion for summary judgment, which 
motion sought complete judgment."  Kiewit II, supra, at *6. 
28
.   Kiewit Eastern also claims a right to attorneys' fees 
and costs, but it clearly is not a "prevailing party," within the 
meaning of the subcontract. 
  
in hindsight as seeking fees from L&R.29  See, e.g., Brickner v. 
Voinovich, 977 F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting arguments 
not "adequately raised" in the district court are waived on 
appeal), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993). 
 Kiewit/Perini also claims it specifically included a 
request for attorneys' fees and costs from L&R Construction in 
its motion for summary judgment.  Yet, under local district court 
rules, "[e]very motion not certified as uncontested shall be 
accompanied by a brief containing a concise statement of the 
legal contentions and authorities relied upon in support of the 
motion."  E.D. Pa. R. Civ. P. 20(c).  As we have noted, this was 
not done.30 
 Finally, Kiewit/Perini points out that it briefed the 
issue of fees and costs against L&R Construction in a motion to 
amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), which the district court 
denied.  Courts often take a dim view of issues raised for the 
first time in post-judgment motions.  Generally, this is a 
decision within the sound discretion of the district court.  In 
                     
29
.   In that same memorandum of law, however, Kiewit/Perini 
devoted an entire subsection to the reasons it should receive 
attorneys' fees from CNA Insurance. 
30
.   We have noted the importance of similar rules at the 
appellate level requiring that issues raised on appeal must be 
accompanied by supporting arguments.  See, e.g., Travitz v. 
Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 711 (3d 
Cir.) (citations omitted) ("Under Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(5), an 
appellant is required to list the issues raised on appeal and 
present an argument in support of them.  When an issue is not 
pursued in the argument section of the brief, the appellant has 
abandoned and waived that issue on appeal."), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 2165 (1994).   
  
this case, the issue of attorneys' fees and costs related to the 
contract dispute at the center of the summary judgment motions, 
but it was not adequately raised at the time.  Thus, we do not 
believe the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Kiewit/Perini's Rule 59(e) motion. 
   III.  
 Having determined that L&R Construction owes 
Kiewit/Perini a duty of defense and conditional indemnification, 
we turn to the question whether the district court properly 
dismissed CNA Insurance from the case.  Once the district court 
ruled that the subcontract entitled Kiewit/Perini to a defense 
and indemnification, it dismissed the claims against CNA 
Insurance as moot.  Kiewit I, supra, at *8.  We believe a 
determination of the responsibilities of CNA Insurance is 
necessary, however, to resolve not only whether CNA Insurance 
must defend and indemnify Kiewit/Perini, but also whether it 
acted in bad faith in denying Kiewit/Perini's tenders of defense, 
thereby justifying an award of attorneys' fees and costs.31 
 A. 
 Section 10 of the subcontract between Kiewit/Perini and 
L&R Construction provided: 
  INSURANCE.  Prior to commencement of 
Work, Subcontractor shall procure and at all 
times thereafter maintain with insurers 
acceptable to Contractor the following 
minimum insurance protecting the 
                     
31
.   That CNA Insurance appealed from the district court's 
judgment, which dismissed the complaint against it as moot, 
demonstrates it continues to have a vital stake in the outcome of 
this proceeding. 
  
Subcontractor, Owner and the Contractor 
against liability from damages because of 
injuries including death, suffered by 
persons, including employees of the 
Subcontractor . . . in connection with the 
performance of this Subcontract.  
After the subcontract was signed, L&R Construction purchased from 
CNA Insurance a policy covering liability arising out of L&R 
Construction's incidental contracts.  CNA Insurance concedes that 
this policy requires it to fulfill any duty to defend and 
indemnify that L&R Construction has under the subcontract.32  
Because we ruled that L&R Construction owes a duty to defend and 
conditionally indemnify Kiewit/Perini under the subcontract, see 
supra section II.A, it is evident that CNA Insurance now bears 
the same duty.33  
 B. 
 Now that we have decided CNA Insurance must defend and 
conditionally indemnify Kiewit/Perini, the question arises as to 
whether it must reimburse Kiewit/Perini for its costs.  To 
resolve this issue, we must consider the scope of the insurer's 
duty to defend: 
                     
32
.   Brief of Appellees/Cross Appellant CNA Insurance 
Company, at 43 ("CNA agrees, that if, an indemnification 
obligation arose from the language of the L&R-Kiewit/Perini 
subcontract, the coverage obligations of the L&R-CNA contractual 
liability coverage would trigger, i.e., CNA would have to fulfill 
the defense and indemnification obligations to which its insured 
had contractually agreed."). 
33
.   Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary for 
us to determine whether Kiewit/Perini was an additional insured 
or a third-party beneficiary of the insurance policy between L&R 
Construction and CNA Insurance. 
  
 Under Pennsylvania law, an insurance company 
is obligated to defend an insured whenever 
the complaint filed by the injured party may 
potentially come within the policy's 
coverage.  The obligation to defend is 
determined solely by the allegations of the 
complaint in the action.  The duty to defend 
remains with the insurer until the insurer 
can confine the claim to a recovery that is 
not within the scope of the policy. 
American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 628 A.2d 880, 
887 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn, 
766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted).  Because 
CNA Insurance has failed to satisfy its duty to defend, 
Kiewit/Perini asserts it should be reimbursed for its costs 
incurred in defending the underlying tort suits and in bringing 
this declaratory judgment action. 
 First, we consider those costs that Kiewit/Perini 
already has incurred in defending itself from the personal injury 
claims made by Chen, the injured worker.  As previously noted, 
CNA Insurance has conceded, if L&R Construction had a duty to 
defend and indemnify Kiewit/Perini, then CNA Insurance must 
fulfill that duty on behalf of L&R.34  When an insurer 
erroneously denies its duty to defend, fulfillment of the duty 
requires the insurer to pay for any defense costs already 
incurred.35  Such fees only can be awarded for services rendered 
                     
34
.   See supra note 32. 
35
.   See, e.g., Carpenter v. Federal Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 
1008, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) ("If a duty to defend is found 
on the part of an insurer, it is also the insurer's 
responsibility to pay for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 
the insured in the underlying action."); Imperial Casualty & 
Indem. Co. v. High Concrete Structures, Inc., 858 F.2d 128, 131 
  
from the time "the duty to defend arose."  Heffernan & Co. v. 
Hartford Ins. Co. of Am., 614 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992).  Thus, because CNA Insurance had a duty to defend but 
denied that duty, the insurer must reimburse Kiewit/Perini for 
the costs it has incurred so far in defending the underlying tort 
claims.   
 Second, we must determine whether Kiewit/Perini is 
entitled to its costs in pursuing the present declaratory 
judgment action.  For more than a decade, Pennsylvania courts 
have permitted attorneys' fees in this situation, but only when 
the insurer has acted in bad faith.36   Carpenter v. Federal Ins. 
(..continued) 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[i]f an insurer has a duty to defend a suit 
and is requested to provide a defense, then that insurer is 
clearly obligated to pay fees and costs incurred by the insured 
in defending the suit," including reimbursing the insured for 
fees and costs already paid).   
36
.   Awards for the "bad faith" conduct of insurers appear 
possible under at least two theories.  First, a 1990 Pennsylvania 
statute permits an insured to bring an action for interest, 
attorneys' fees, court costs, and punitive damages against an 
insurer for its bad faith acts under an insurance policy.  42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371 (Supp. 1994).  Second, Pennsylvania 
courts have long held that "an insured who is compelled to bring 
a declaratory judgment action to establish his insurer's duty to 
defend an action brought by a third party may recover his 
attorneys' fees incurred in the declaratory judgment action if 
the insurer has, in bad faith, refused to defend the action 
brought by the third party."  Kelmo Enters., Inc. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 426 A.2d 680, 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).  We do 
not believe the statutory remedy is implicated here because 
Kiewit/Perini has not brought a separate cause of action for 
damages, but has merely claimed the fees incidental to this 
declaratory judgment suit.  See, e.g., Asplundh Tree Expert Co. 
v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 90-6976, 1991 WL 
147461, at *5-10 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1991) (distinguishing between 
claims brought under the Pennsylvania statute and those sought 
under the Kelmo rationale); Liberty Fish Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 
Civ. A. No. 89-5201, 1990 WL 161139, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 
  
Co., 637 A.2d 1008, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (citing First Pa. 
Bank v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 580 A.2d 799, 803 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990)) ("an insured who is compelled to bring a 
declaratory judgment action to establish his insurer's duty to 
defend an action brought by a third party may recover attorneys' 
fees if the insurer has, in bad faith, refused to defend the 
action brought by the third party").  See also Kelmo Enters., 
Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 426 A.2d 680, 685 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1981); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 769 (3d Cir. 
1985).  As the court stated in Carpenter, 637 A.2d at 1013, "[t]o 
compel appellees to expend thousands of dollars to enforce their 
contractual right to a defense and indemnification would fly in 
the face of equity."  
 The language of some of these decisions, however, seems 
to limit this award of costs to an "insured" against its insurer.  
In this case, Kiewit/Perini may not be an "insured" of CNA 
Insurance.37  But we believe such a distinction does not matter 
here because an award of fees does not rest on a contract between 
the parties.  As this court stated in Trustees of University of 
Pennsylvania v. Lexington Insurance Co., 815 F.2d 890, 910-11 
(3d. Cir. 1987): 
(..continued) 
1990) ("The allegations of bad faith are not put forth as a 
separate claim for damages, but seek the incidental award of 
attorneys' fees.").   
37
.   As we have noted, we decline to decide whether 
Kiewit/Perini is an additional insured or a third-party 
beneficiary of the insurance contract between CNA Insurance and 
L&R Construction.  See supra note 33. 
  
 Although the Kelmo court purported to connect 
its holding to a contract analysis, the 
holding truly rested on a quasi-tort view 
that attorneys' fees represent compensation 
for an insurer's violation of its obligation 
to act in good faith.  The mere contractual 
obligation of the insurer to pay for the 
costs of defending its insured does not 
include the obligation to pay for the 
insured's suit against its insurer.38 
 In this case, as we have already found, CNA Insurance 
owed Kiewit/Perini the duty to defend, and CNA Insurance breached 
that duty.  As a result of the breach, Kiewit/Perini was forced 
to defend itself in the underlying tort suits and incur the 
expense of bringing this declaratory judgment action.  We are 
satisfied the necessary "quasi-tort" elements exist here to 
permit the possibility of an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
to Kiewit/Perini.  Therefore, we remand this case to the district 
court to determine whether CNA Insurance acted in "bad faith" so 
as to justify an award of costs and attorneys' fees arising out 
of this declaratory judgment action.  The district court should 
also determine the fees and costs to which Kiewit/Perini is 
entitled for defending itself in the underlying tort suits.39 
                     
38
.   See also Liberty Fish Co. v. Home Indem. Co., Civ. A. 
No. 89-5201, 1990 WL 161139, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1990) (in 
Lexington Insurance, "the Third Circuit emphasized that its 
holding was not based on the particular contractual obligations 
involved, but rested instead on the general principle of tort 
that reimbursement is due where expenses are incurred as the 
result of the fault of another").  
39
.   The district court should award only those fees and 
costs related to Kiewit/Perini's claims.  Since neither L&R 
Construction nor CNA Insurance has a duty to defend or indemnify 
Kiewit Eastern, the fee award should not include any costs 
attributable to Kiewit Eastern. 
  
 IV. 
 Overall, we believe that L&R Construction and CNA 
Insurance have a duty to defend and conditionally indemnify 
Kiewit/Perini, but not Kiewit Eastern.  We remand to the district 
court to determine whether the insurance company's actions rise 
to the level of "bad faith."  In any event, CNA Insurance must 
reimburse Kiewit/Perini for the costs and fees it has incurred in 
defending itself against the underlying tort claims.  In all 
other respects, we will affirm the district court. 
  
                         
 
